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INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys recent developments in criminal procedure
and law in Virginia. Because of space limitations, the authors
have limited their discussion to the most significant appellate decisions and legislation.
I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. Continuances
In Reyes v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia was
asked to determine whether a trial court erred in denying a defendant a continuance to prepare for sentencing with his new retained counsel pursuant to Virginia Code section 19.2-159.1.1 At
the defendant’s second sentencing date, retained counsel explained that he needed time to prepare and to explore potentially
withdrawing the defendant’s guilty plea.2
The supreme court explained that the General Assembly enacted section 19.2-159.1 in order to minimize the burden on taxpayers to pay the cost of court-appointed counsel when a defendant
could pay for his own attorney.3 Although the statute provides
that the trial court shall grant reasonable continuances to prepare for trial, the supreme court found that this was to aid the
primary fiscal purpose of the act and not to confer “a new, statutory right for a criminal defendant.”4 Reyes made no argument
that the trial court’s decision impacted his constitutional right,
and the supreme court otherwise determined that the defendant
was not entitled to his requested remedy.5
B. Jury Instructions
In Smith v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed whether the defendant waived her arguments challenging the agreed upon jury instructions, which determined the law

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

297 Va. 133, 135–36, 823 S.E.2d 243, 245–46 (2019).
Id. at 136–37, 823 S.E.2d at 246.
Id. at 140, 823 S.E.2d at 248.
Id. at 140–41, 823 S.E.2d at 248.
Id. at 141–42, 823 S.E.2d at 249.
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of the case.6 A jury found Smith guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and following her conviction, Smith argued that the evidence
was insufficient to show any intentional killing or heat of passion.7 In her motion to set aside, she argued for the first time that
her dispute with the victim was “a minor verbal argument,” and
that words alone are insufficient to qualify as heat of passion.8
The supreme court found that Smith raised the issue that
words alone are insufficient too late.9 Because Smith agreed to jury instructions that omitted the legal principles she relied upon
on appeal, those jury instructions became the law of the case, and
she accordingly waived that issue.10 The supreme court concluded
the evidence was sufficient to support Smith’s conviction and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals under the doctrine of
“right result for a different reason.”11
In Lienau v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia,
sitting en banc, reversed an involuntary manslaughter conviction
for the trial court’s failure to provide a self-defense jury instruction.12 The Commonwealth argued that the defendant, originally
charged with first-degree murder, never testified that he was
afraid, but instead said that he was “raging” and “saw red.”13 The
court found, however, that there was sufficient credible evidence
in the record, viewed in the light most favorable to Lienau, to
support his right to a self-defense jury instruction.14 The court also held that even though Lienau was acquitted of murder when
the jury found him guilty of involuntary manslaughter, the error
could have affected the verdict and reversed his conviction.15


6. 296 Va. 450, 459, 821 S.E.2d 543, 548 (2018).
7. Id. at 458, 821 S.E.2d at 547–48.
8. Id. at 458–59, 821 S.E.2d at 547–48.
9. Id. at 462, 821 S.E.2d at 549.
10. Id. at 462, 821 S.E.2d at 549.
11. Id. at 463, 821 S.E.2d at 549.
12. 69 Va. App. 780, 780–81, 823 S.E.2d 43, 44 (2019) (en banc); Lienau v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 254, 260, 818 S.E.2d 58, 60–61 (2018).
13. Lienau, 69 Va. App. at 263, 268, 818 S.E.2d at 62, 64–65.
14. Id. at 268–69, 818 S.E.2d at 65.
15. Id. at 269–70, 273, 275, 818 S.E.2d at 65, 67–68.
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C. Appellate Procedure and Jurisdiction
In Martinez v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered an appeal from a deaf and mute inmate originally
from El Salvador who was previously found incompetent to stand
trial.16 Martinez had been receiving inpatient treatment to restore his competency under Virginia Code section 19.2-169.2 in
order to try him for two counts of capital murder.17 Martinez appealed directly to the supreme court from the circuit court’s denial of two motions to dismiss the indictments, on the theory that
the denials were civil in nature.18 The supreme court found it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal, holding that
an appeal from a competency determination is criminal in nature,
and thus may not be considered by the supreme court without
first being considered by the court of appeals.19 The supreme
court also declined to transfer the case to the court of appeals, because no final order had been entered in the underlying prosecution, and the court of appeals was thus without jurisdiction to
hear an appeal in the matter.20 The court dismissed the appeal
without prejudice because the court found there was no final conviction and no final order.21
Ordinarily, an appellant’s failure to invoke the ends of justice
exception to Supreme Court of Virginia Rule 5A:18’s preservation
requirement precludes the Court of Appeals of Virginia from
reaching an issue under that exception.22 The court held in Merritt v. Commonwealth that even where an appellant does not invoke the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18, the Commonwealth may successfully do so on her behalf.23 Merritt missed a
revocation proceeding and was convicted of failure to appear in
violation of section 19.2-128(C); however, she did not challenge
the section’s applicability to revocation proceedings before either
the trial court or the court of appeals (despite the latter court’s 

16. 296 Va. 387, 387, 821 S.E.2d 529, 530 (2018).
17. Id. at 387, 821 S.E.2d at 530.
18. Id. at 388, 821 S.E.2d at 530.
19. Id. at 388–89, 821 S.E.2d at 530–31.
20. Id. at 390, 821 S.E.2d at 531.
21. Id. at 390, 821 S.E.2d at 531.
22. See Merritt v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 452, 459–61, 820 S.E.2d 379, 382–83
(2018) (citing VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:18 (Repl. Vol. 2019)).
23. Id. at 461, 820 S.E.2d at 383.
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explicit direction to address the issue in its order granting Merritt’s petition for appeal).24 The Commonwealth, on brief and at
oral argument, conceded that Merritt’s conduct did not fall under
her statute of conviction, and contended that though Merritt had
not raised the argument, the court could still reach it under the
ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18.25 The court agreed based
on its independent analysis that the Commonwealth’s concession
was appropriate, applied the ends of justice exception, and reversed Merritt’s conviction.26
D. Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas
In Brown v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the defendant failed to demonstrate a sufficient
basis to allow her to withdraw a guilty plea under Virginia Code
section 19.2-296.27 The court found that although the defendant
raised her motion to withdraw before the trial court entered the
written sentencing order, the trial court had pronounced the sentence from the bench.28 Consequently, the defendant needed to
show that there was a “manifest injustice” in order to withdraw
her guilty plea.29 The court determined there was insufficient
cause because her defense was not viable.30 The court also found
that her failure to understand the collateral consequences of her
conviction did not provide a basis for setting aside a guilty plea.31
In Thomason v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia reviewed a circuit court’s denial of a defendant’s pre-sentencing
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas to second-degree murder,
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and use of a firearm
in the commission of a felony.32 Thomason argued in his motion

24. Id. at 455–56, 820 S.E.2d at 380–81 (citing Lawson v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App.
93, 561 S.E.2d 775 (2002)).
25. Id. at 456–57, 461, 820 S.E.2d at 381, 383.
26. Id. at 461–62, 820 S.E.2d at 383–84.
27. 826 S.E.2d 883, 886, 888 (2019).
28. Id. at 886.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 887.
31. Id. at 887–88.
32. 69 Va. App. 89, 92, 815 S.E.2d 816, 817 (2018). The Court also considered whether
Thomason’s sentencing was an abuse of discretion and held there was no abuse of discretion because the sentence was within the statutory limitations. Id. at 98–99, 815 S.E.2d at
820.

<$7(6'2&; '2127'(/(7( 

2019]

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

$0

37

that he learned of the existence of an exculpatory witness, whose
testimony would impeach another witness, after he accepted the
plea agreement, and that this discovery constituted a material
mistake of fact.33 The court of appeals affirmed Thomason’s conviction because “potential impeachment of witness testimony does
not satisfy the Parris34 standard.”35 The court explained that a
mere discovery of a conflict of testimony does not establish a “reasonable defense” sufficient to withdraw a guilty plea.36
E. Venue
In McGuire v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
clarified that venue for the prosecution of making a false report
regarding the commission of a crime is proper in either the jurisdiction where the report was made or where it was received.37
McGuire made a false police report from an unknown location to
the Loudoun County Sheriff’s Department, and was subsequently
prosecuted for the report in Loudoun County.38 The court of appeals held that (1) venue is proper in either the sending or receiving jurisdiction; (2) a report must both be sent by the defendant
and received by an officer to complete the offense; and (3) once
completed, the offense has “occurred” in part in both locations.39
F. Sentencing
In Hall v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia clarified that a defendant’s disclosure supporting his motion for relief
under the “safety valve” provision of Virginia Code section 18.2248(C) is considered timely if it is provided at any time before the
commencement of the sentencing hearing.40 Under the “safety
valve” provision, the mandatory minimum sentences provided in
section 18.2-248 do not apply if the defendant meets five statuto-

33. Id. at 93, 815 S.E.2d at 817–18.
34. Parris v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 321, 52 S.E.2d 872 (1949).
35. Thomason, 69 Va. App. at 96, 99, 815 S.E.2d at 819, 820–21.
36. Id. at 96, 815 S.E.2d at 819 (discussing Williams v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App.
238, 717 S.E.2d 837 (2011)).
37. 68 Va. App. 736, 740–41, 813 S.E.2d 552, 554 (2018).
38. Id. at 738–39, 813 S.E.2d at 553–54.
39. Id. at 741–45, 813 S.E.2d at 555–57.
40. 296 Va. 577, 580, 583, 586, 821 S.E.2d 921, 923–24, 926 (2018).
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ry criteria.41 The fifth requirement provides that “[n]ot later than
the time of the sentencing hearing, the person has truthfully provided to the Commonwealth all information and evidence the person has concerning the offense.”42 Hall was convicted of three offenses subject to mandatory minimum sentences, and provided a
disclosure pursuant to this requirement just before his sentencing
hearing commenced.43
The trial court held that the disclosure was untimely, but the
supreme court reversed, holding that the statute unambiguously
provided a deadline of the sentencing hearing’s commencement,
and that last-minute disclosures are thus timely.44
In Stone v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia clarified a different component of eligibility for the “safety valve” provision of Virginia Code section 18.2-248(C)—the requirement that
“[t]he person did not . . . possess a firearm . . . in connection with
the offense.”45 Stone sold cocaine four times during a one-month
period to a confidential informant; when police executed a search
warrant following the fourth controlled buy, they discovered a
loaded AK-47 along with cocaine in Stone’s bedroom.46 Stone argued that he obtained the firearm for personal protection following an earlier robbery, and that he thus did not own it “in connection” with his drug distribution offenses for “safety valve”
purposes.47
The supreme court rejected Stone’s arguments, noting that he
bore the burdens of production and persuasion to show entitlement to relief under the “safety valve” provision.48 The court held
that the evidence showed Stone constructively possessed the firearm while conducting four drug sales to the confidential informant “at that location,” and that by failing to present any evidence
to the contrary, Stone “plainly failed to carry his burden of estab-

41. Id. at 580, 821 S.E.2d at 923.
42. Id. at 580, 821 S.E.2d at 923 (emphasis omitted).
43. Id. at 580–81, 821 S.E.2d at 923.
44. Id. at 583, 586–88, 821 S.E.2d at 924, 926–27. The court cautioned, however, that
trial courts may consider a disclosure’s last-minute nature as an indication that it is not
truthful or complete. Id. at 586–88, 821 S.E.2d at 926–27.
45. 297 Va. 100, 100–01, 823 S.E.2d 241, 241–42 (2019).
46. Id. at 102, 823 S.E.2d at 243.
47. Id. at 102–03, 823 S.E.2d at 243.
48. Id. at 101–03, 823 S.E.2d at 242–43.
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lishing that he did not possess the firearm in connection with
these four . . . offenses.”49 The court further held that the evidence
supported “the affirmative inference . . . that Stone in fact possessed the firearm for the protection of his illegal drug operation
being conducted out of his residence.”50
In Botkin v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia (1)
addressed whether the Court of Appeals of Virginia erred by holding that multiple mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment,
imposed for multiple convictions of possession of a firearm within
ten years of being convicted as a felon under Virginia Code section 18.2-308.2(A), were required to be served consecutively; and
(2) remanded to the circuit court to impose two consecutive sentences.51 The supreme court explained that section 18.2-308.2(A)
specifically states that “[t]he mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment prescribed for violations of this section shall be
served consecutively with any other sentence,” and thus Botkin’s
sentences must be run consecutively.52
In Thomas v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
found that a trial court erred by adding three years, all suspended, after imposing the entire jury sentence as active incarceration.53 The supreme court explained that the trial court had an
obligation under Virginia Code section 19.2-295.2 to impose a
term up to three years of post-release supervision under the review of the Parole Board, and was required under “[section] 18.210 to impose a linked suspended term of incarceration.”54 Thomas’s sentencing order “as written” was unlawful, however, because it did not specify that the additional three years of suspended incarceration was imposed pursuant to sections 18.2-10
and 19.2-295.2, nor did it specify that the supervision was subject
to the review of the Virginia Parole Board.55
In Robinson v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia found no error in a trial court’s decision not to redact a defend-

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 103, 823 S.E.2d at 243.
Id. at 103, 823 S.E.2d at 243.
296 Va. 309, 311–13, 318, 819 S.E.2d 652, 653, 656 (2018).
Id. at 314–16, 819 S.E.2d at 654–55 (emphasis omitted).
296 Va. 301, 303, 819 S.E.2d 437, 438 (2018).
Id. at 306–07, 819 S.E.2d at 439–40.
Id. at 307, 819 S.E.2d at 440.
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ant’s prior conviction order during the sentencing phase of a jury
trial, even though it “included information about a charge for
which Mr. Robinson was not convicted.”56 The court found that
the plain language of Virginia Code section 19.2-295.1 allows the
Commonwealth to introduce conviction orders in their entirety.57
The court noted that the General Assembly amended the statute
in 2007 to allow presentation of a defendant’s prior criminal history, thus broadening what may be shown to the jury.58 The court
found that the statute did not require that the jury be shielded
from such information, and that it was admissible regardless as
part of the defendant’s criminal history.59 As a result, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the unredacted
conviction order.60
G. Restitution
In Fleisher v. Commonwealth, Fleisher was ordered to pay restitution for lost cash, to replace the keys and locks on a Hyundai,
and to replace the keys and reset the computer system on a Toyota after she stole the victim’s keys and drove the victim’s Hyundai, which contained the victim’s purse.61 The Hyundai was recovered unlocked but the keys to the Hyundai and the victim’s
purse, which had contained cash and keys to the Toyota, were
never recovered.62 In affirming the judgment, the Court of Appeals of Virginia found that the trial court ordered Fleisher “to
pay restitution for a loss directly caused by the offense.”63 The
court explained that the new lock and key systems in both cars
were not security upgrades, but rather “made the victim whole by
returning her to [her] pre-crime status when she controlled access
to her cars.”64

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

68 Va. App. 602, 604–05, 811 S.E.2d 861, 862–63.
Id. at 607, 811 S.E.2d at 864.
Id. at 608, 811 S.E.2d at 864.
Id. at 609, 811 S.E.2d at 865.
Id. at 609, 811 S.E.2d at 865.
69 Va. App. 685, 687–88, 822 S.E.2d 679, 680–81 (2019).
Id. at 687, 882 S.E.2d at 680–81.
Id. at 690, 882 S.E.2d at 682.
Id. at 691, 882 S.E.2d at 682–83.
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In Ellis v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed a trial court’s restitution award.65 Ellis was initially
charged with burglary, grand larceny, larceny of a firearm, and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.66 Ellis entered an Alford plea to receiving stolen property, which had been reduced
from grand larceny, and the remaining charges were nolle prosquied.67 The police had only recovered a $450 television from Ellis.68 The court found the $1500 award improper because “Ellis’s
conviction for receiving stolen property preclude[d] him from being deemed the thief,” and the only loss attributable to Ellis was
valued at $450, the value of the property he was convicted
of receiving.69
H. Victim Impact Evidence
In Baldwin v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
affirmed a trial court’s admission at sentencing of victim impact
testimony referencing the defendant’s prior criminal offenses.70 In
2012, Baldwin was sentenced to five years, with four years suspended, for making a written threat to kill his victim, M.T.; he
later violated a protective order preventing him from being near
her, and had his suspended sentence revoked.71 Angry about his
revocation, Baldwin wrote numerous new letters threatening to
kill M.T., and pled guilty in 2016 to a new charge of making a
written threat to kill M.T.72 At his sentencing, M.T. testified regarding Baldwin’s criminal conduct toward her, past and present,
explaining the impact of his threats at sentencing.73 The court of
appeals rejected Baldwin’s argument that M.T.’s testimony regarding his past crimes was inadmissible, holding that it was relevant to understanding the impact of his present crime, and that 

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

68 Va. App. 706, 708, 813 S.E.2d 16, 17 (2018).
Id. at 708, 813 S.E.2d at 17.
Id. at 708, 813 S.E.2d at 17.
Id. at 709, 710 n.2, 813 S.E.2d at 18, 18 n.2.
Id. at 715–16, 813 S.E.2d at 21.
69 Va. App. 75, 78–79, 815 S.E.2d 809, 810–11 (2018).
Id. at 78, 815 S.E.2d at 810.
Id. at 79–80, 815 S.E.2d at 810–11.
Id. at 80–81, 815 S.E.2d at 811–12.
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he had no right to sanitize the evidence of his “ongoing pattern of
threatening and psychologically tormenting this particular victim.”74
I. Batson Challenges
In Hamilton v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the trial court did not err in denying Hamilton’s Batson75 motion.76 At trial, Hamilton asserted that the prosecutor
struck three jury pool members because they were black.77 The
court rejected Hamilton’s argument that the prosecutor’s reasoning for striking a juror for not answering any questions was pretextual, because Hamilton did not identify any non-African
American jurors who did not answer any questions.78
J. Fourth Amendment Issues
In Curley v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected the defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s denial of a
suppression motion.79 There, an officer conducted a lawful traffic
stop and observed the defendant, the sole occupant of the vehicle,
nervously hunched over a backpack, “shaking,” and “breathing
heavily.”80 The officer asked Curley to step out of the vehicle and
obtained permission from him to search his person.81 Officers
found a digital scale with “white residue” that was “very consistent” with drug distribution based on the officers’ training,
leading them to search his vehicle and find additional evidence.82


74. Id. at 84–89, 815 S.E.2d at 813–16.
75. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
76. 69 Va. App. 176, 181, 197–98, 817 S.E.2d 343, 345–46, 354 (2018). The court also
considered whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Hamilton of obstruction of justice and whether the trial court erred in issuing a jury instruction. The court held the evidence was sufficient and Hamilton invited error when he requested the jury instruction.
Id. at 198, 817 S.E.2d at 354.
77. Id. at 182, 817 S.E.2d at 346.
78. Id. at 190, 817 S.E.2d at 350.
79. 295 Va. 616, 618, 816 S.E.2d 587, 588 (2018).
80. Id. at 619, 816 S.E.2d at 588.
81. Id. at 619, 816 S.E.2d at 588.
82. Id. at 619–20, 816 S.E.2d at 588–89.
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The supreme court found that the officers had probable cause
to conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle.83 The court held
that Curley’s furtive movements, his overly nervous demeanor,
and his possession of a digital scale provided sufficient justification for the vehicle’s search.84
In Collins v. Commonwealth, on remand from the Supreme
Court of the United States, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether any exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, other than the automobile exception, justified a
search of a motorcycle located within the curtilage of a residence.85 The court found that the good-faith exception applied,
noting that a reasonably well-trained officer at the time of the
search could have believed that Scher v. United States86 authorized his search of the motorcycle.87 The court moreover held that
“a considerable body of caselaw had developed that applied the
automobile exception to driveways without considering whether,
and if so where, the curtilage boundary might intersect with the
driveway,” thereby supporting the search’s reasonableness.88
In Brown v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that a trial court did not err by refusing to suppress evidence
obtained by warrant, rejecting the appellant’s claim that the affidavit supporting the search warrant did not establish probable
cause.89 Brown was arrested while attempting to purchase more
than five pounds of marijuana from his wife’s vehicle, with more
than $5000 on his person.90 Police applied for a warrant to search
Brown’s home, representing that information from various
sources (including the circumstances of Brown’s arrest) indicated
that Brown was using his home as a base of operation for drug
distribution activities.91 A magistrate issued the warrant, and police found 394.55 grams of cocaine and roughly $4500 at Brown’s

83. Id. at 623, 816 S.E.2d at 591.
84. Id. at 623, 816 S.E.2d at 590–91.
85. 297 Va. 207, 211, 824 S.E.2d 485, 487 (2019) (citing Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct.
1663, 1668 (2018)).
86. 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
87. Collins, 297 Va. at 219–20, 224–25, 824 S.E.2d at 491–92, 494–95.
88. Id. at 225, 824 S.E.2d at 495.
89. 68 Va. App. 517, 520, 810 S.E.2d 905, 907 (2018).
90. Id. at 521, 810 S.E.2d at 907.
91. Id. at 520–22, 810 S.E.2d at 907–08.
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home.92 Brown moved to suppress the fruits of the warrant, arguing that the information in the affidavit did not establish a nexus
between Brown’s alleged activities and his home.93 The court of
appeals affirmed, finding that the affidavit established probable
cause to support a search of Brown’s home.94
The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the trial court’s denial of a suppression motion on Fourth Amendment grounds in
Carlson v. Commonwealth.95 Uniformed police officers smelled
marijuana in a trailer park and walked around individual trailers, sniffing at their doors and windows, until they isolated Carlson’s residence as the probable source of the odor.96 A detective
walked up to the main entrance of the residence, confirmed the
odor emanating from the door, and obtained a warrant on the basis of his observations.97 Carlson was arrested, and police discovered, among other things, a marijuana grow site, a large quantity
of harvested marijuana, and a police scanner.98 Carlson moved to
suppress the fruits of the search, alleging that the detective’s
presence on his property, and the resulting warrant, were the direct result of the uniformed officers’ illegal initial entry onto his
property.99 Carlson did not challenge the warrant.100 The court of
appeals found the search unlawful, holding that (1) the detective’s
search was not an independent source since his presence was a
direct result of the uniformed officers’ unlawful entry; (2) nothing
occurred to remove the taint of the original illegality of the uniformed officers’ search; and (3) the record lacked any evidence
justifying a finding of inevitable discovery.101

92. Id. at 520–21, 810 S.E.2d at 907.
93. Id. at 520, 810 S.E.2d at 907.
94. Id. at 528–29, 810 S.E.2d at 911. The court of appeals did not make a finding as to
whether the good faith exception applied, which was the rationale used by the lower court.
Id. at 528–29, 810 S.E.2d at 911.
95. 69 Va. App. 749, 753, 823 S.E.2d 28, 30–31 (2019).
96. Id. at 754, 823 S.E.2d at 31.
97. Id. at 754–55, 823 S.E.2d at 31.
98. Id. at 755, 823 S.E.2d at 31.
99. Id. at 755–56, 823 S.E.2d at 31–32.
100. Id. at 755, 823 S.E.2d at 31–32.
101. Id. at 760–65, 823 S.E.2d at 34–36. The court also held that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Carlson’s conviction, and that he was thus entitled to
remand for a new trial without the tainted evidence rather than a final judgment of acquittal. Id. at 765–67, 823 S.E.2d at 36–37.
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In Daniels v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
affirmed the trial court’s denial of suppression motions.102 Police
investigating a heroin overdose found heroin packaged in wax
paper bags stamped with the word “Miracle” in red ink.103 After
obtaining a search warrant, police found marijuana, a digital
scale, and approximately $1000 in cash in Daniels’s residence.104
Officers saw a bundle of wax paper bags with red stamps, bound
together with a rubber band, in Daniels’s vehicle (which was not
covered by the warrant); an investigator believed the bundle to
contain heroin, and conducted a search which bore out his suspicion.105 The court of appeals rejected Daniels’s arguments that (1)
the affidavit supporting the search warrant was not filed with the
circuit court by the issuing magistrate as required by Virginia
Code section 19.2-54; and (2) the search of the vehicle was not a
valid plain view search, finding instead that the “notice-based
purpose of [section] 19.2-54 was achieved” by the officer’s filing of
the affidavit with the circuit court and that the plain view exception supported the vehicle search because the officer had probable
cause based on his training and experience.106
In Moore v. Commonwealth, Moore refused to comply with a
traffic stop by continuing to drive, jumping out of the car while it
was still in motion, causing the car to crash into two parked cars,
and fleeing the scene.107 Two officers pursued Moore on foot while
a crowd gathered near the crash.108 Moore had left the driver’s
side door open, and a third officer found a firearm near the gas
pedal in plain view.109 He seized the firearm and placed it in his
car for safekeeping.110 The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that
the seizure of the firearm did not violate Moore’s Fourth Amendment rights because exigent circumstances allowed the officer to
seize the easily accessible firearm to protect officer safety and to
protect the safety of officers and the gathered crowd.111

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

69 Va. App. 422, 437, 819 S.E.2d 870, 877 (2018).
Id. at 426–27, 819 S.E.2d at 872.
Id. at 427, 819 S.E.2d at 872.
Id. at 427–28, 819 S.E.2d at 872–73.
Id. at 431–36, 819 S.E.2d at 874–77.
69 Va. App. 30, 34, 813 S.E.2d 916, 917–18 (2018).
Id. at 34, 813 S.E.2d at 918.
Id. at 34, 813 S.E.2d at 918.
Id. at 35, 813 S.E.2d at 918.
Id. at 42, 813 S.E.2d at 921–22.

<$7(6'2&; '2127'(/(7( 

46

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

$0

[Vol. 54:31

K. Miranda Issues
In Secret v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the appellant’s convictions of arson of an occupied dwelling and nine counts of attempted first-degree murder stemming
from the appellant’s burning of the “main dormitory” of a communal living facility.112 Secret argued that admission of evidence
related to his confession violated Miranda v. Arizona,113 as refined by Missouri v. Seibert114 and Oregon v. Elstad,115 and further that the evidence was insufficient to show he acted with a
specific intent to commit murder.116 Secret attempted to burn
down the occupied building after being informed he was not welcome to remain in the community.117 Secret confessed to starting
the fire in an interview conducted without a Miranda warning,
then continued providing inculpatory details after waiving his
Miranda rights.118
The supreme court affirmed the trial court’s finding that police
did not violate Seibert, based on (1) the investigator’s testimony
that he did not administer Miranda warnings at first because he
did not believe Secret to be in custody until Secret inculpated
himself; (2) the lack of coercion in the pre-warning phase of the
interview; and (3) the investigator’s unfamiliarity with the twostep interrogation technique.119 The supreme court likewise rejected Secret’s Elstad-based attack, finding that the totality of the
evidence demonstrated that Secret’s inculpatory statements were
knowing and voluntary.120 Finally, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Secret intended to kill the building’s occupants.121
In Tirado v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether an audiovisual recording of the defendant’s

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

296 Va. 204, 208–09, 819 S.E.2d 234, 237 (2018).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
542 U.S. 600 (2004).
470 U.S. 298 (1985).
Secret, 296 Va. at 208–09, 810 S.E.2d at 237.
Id. at 209–12, 810 S.E.2d at 237–39.
Id. at 212, 810 S.E.2d at 238–39.
Id. at 224, 810 S.E.2d at 245–46.
Id. at 225–27, 810 S.E.2d at 246–47.
Id. at 227–31, 810 S.E.2d at 247–50.
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statements made to police officers through an interpreter was
properly admitted into evidence, and whether the defendant’s
waiver of rights under Miranda was knowingly and voluntarily
made.122 On appeal, Tirado asserted the evidence was insufficient
to establish his waiver was knowing and voluntary because it was
not in his native language, Mam, and his Spanish comprehension
was limited.123
The supreme court held that there was an adequate foundation
to admit the recording.124 The supreme court found that the interrogator testified that the recording accurately depicted her interview and that, in and of itself, satisfied Supreme Court of Virginia Rule 2:901.125 The court also found that Tirado’s waiver was
voluntary because it was not the product of “intimidation, coercion, or deception.”126 The supreme court focused on the fact that
Tirado chose to communicate in Spanish, never spoke in Mam,
said “Spanish ‘would be fine’” to discuss Miranda, chose to write
an apology letter in Spanish, said he understood each Miranda
right in Spanish after it was read in Spanish, and responded appropriately in Spanish to the officer’s questions.127
In Spinner v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether the trial court erred when it held that Spinner was effectively advised under Miranda.128 Police officers approached Spinner in an open carport near a sidewalk the day after a murder to execute a search warrant to obtain a DNA
sample.129 An officer read Spinner his Miranda warnings and included, “And I always caveat that with: ‘If you’re charged with a
crime.’ You can decide at any time to exercise any of these rights
and stop answering questions.”130 Later, after his arrest, Spinner
was questioned after being read the same Miranda warnings and
made incriminating statements.131

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

296 Va. 15, 18, 817 S.E.2d 309, 310–11 (2018).
Id. at 20, 27, 817 S.E.2d at 312, 316.
Id. at 27, 817 S.E.2d at 316.
Id. at 27, 817 S.E.2d at 315.
Id. at 28–30, 817 S.E.2d at 317.
Id. at 29–30, 817 S.E.2d at 317.
827 S.E.2d 772, 775 (2019).
Id. at 774.
Id.
Id.
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The supreme court affirmed Spinner’s convictions, holding that
Spinner was not in custody the day after the murder, so Miranda
warnings were not constitutionally required.132 The court also
held that the warnings read to Spinner on both days met the requirements under Miranda because “Miranda requires ‘only that
the suspect be informed . . . that he has a right to an attorney before and during questioning and that an attorney would be appointed for him if he could not afford one.’”133
L. Double Jeopardy
In Severance v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
affirmed Severance’s two convictions for capital murder.134 Severance killed Ronald Kirby in 2013, then Ruthanne Lodato in 2014;
he was convicted under Virginia Code section 18.2-31(8), which
classifies the “killing of more than one person within a three-year
period,” as capital murder, by killing Kirby within three years of
killing Lodato, and by killing Lodato within three years of killing
Kirby.135 On appeal, Severance contended his two life sentences
violated the multiple punishment prohibition under Blockburger
v. United States.136
The supreme court affirmed Severance’s convictions, holding
that Blockburger protections are limited to cases where “the same
act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions.”137 The court reasoned that the General Assembly set
the appropriate unit of prosecution as one murder, and it did not
set a temporal restriction on the second murder “within three
years” as being before or after the murder that is the subject of a
given charge; accordingly, Severance’s two punishments for two
murders were permissible.138

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 776.
Id. at 777 (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 204 (1989)).
295 Va. 564, 567, 816 S.E.2d 277, 278 (2018).
Id. at 567–68, 816 S.E.2d at 278.
284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); Severance, 295 Va. at 568, 816 S.E.2d at 278–79.
Severance, 295 Va. at 567, 570–71, 816 S.E.2d at 278, 280.
Id. at 568, 576, 816 S.E.2d at 279, 283.
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II. CRIMINAL LAW
A. Assault and Battery
In Marshall v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
examined whether all violations of Virginia Code section 18.257.2, assault and battery on a family or household member, must
be disclosed on mandatory firearm purchase forms.139 The trial
court convicted Marshall of making a false statement on ATF
Form 4473 in violation of section 18.2-308.2:2 when Marshall did
not disclose that he had been convicted of a “misdemeanor crime
of domestic violence,” despite his prior conviction for assault and
battery against a family member.140 The court of appeals found
that any conviction under section 18.2-57.2 qualifies as a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,” and there was accordingly
sufficient evidence to affirm Marshall’s conviction.141 The court
reasoned that domestic violence, as listed in the federal form in
question, is defined by federal law, and a recent United States
Supreme Court decision held that “the requirement of ‘physical
force’ is satisfied . . . by ‘the degree of force that supports a common-law battery conviction.’”142
In Kelley v. Commonwealth, the defendant appealed his conviction for misdemeanor assault and battery in violation of Virginia
Code section 18.2-57 to the Court of Appeals of Virginia. 143 Kelley
contested whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that the
appellant committed an assault and battery against his coworker
in violation of section 18.2-57.144 Although Kelley argued that the
evidence did not show that he touched his victim or that he intended to do so in a rude manner, the factfinder found the victim’s testimony credible and found that Kelley attempted to kiss
his co-worker when he knew she was uncomfortable and tried to
pull away.145 The court held that under the appropriate standard

139. 69 Va. App. 648, 650, 822 S.E.2d 389, 391 (2019).
140. Id. at 650–51, 822 S.E.2d at 391.
141. Id. at 658, 822 S.E.2d at 394–95.
142. Id. at 656–57, 822 S.E.2d at 393–94 (quoting United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S.
157, 168 (2014)).
143. 69 Va. App. 617, 621, 822 S.E.2d 375, 377 (2019).
144. Id. at 621, 822 S.E.2d at 377.
145. Id. at 623, 627, 822 S.E.2d at 378–80.
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of review, the evidence was sufficient to uphold his conviction and
rejected his argument that he had implied consent to touch his
victim.146 The court of appeals found that there was no legal basis
to find that holding “the victim’s face against her will, while trying to kiss her, was justified or excused.”147
In Lewis v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
clarified the statutory requirements for a felony conviction of assault and battery against a family or household member under
Virginia Code section 18.2-57.2(B).148 Under this section, a defendant is guilty of a Class 6 felony if he or she commits two specified offenses within twenty years.149 In Lewis, the court made
clear that the statute did not require the defendant to have been
convicted of the two predicate offenses at the time of this offense;
instead, the defendant must have been convicted as of the
indictment.150
B. Firearms
In Barney v. Commonwealth, Barney appealed her use of a
firearm conviction to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, arguing
that the evidence was insufficient and that the trial court erred
when it instructed the jury on the definition of a firearm.151 The
court found that a rational trier of fact could have found that
Barney had an actual firearm or possessed an object “that gave
the appearance of being one” because Barney made statements
and gestures to imply she had a firearm.152 The court of appeals
reversed Barney’s conviction and remanded because the jury instruction given did not require proof that Barney possessed either
an actual firearm or an object that gave the appearance of an actual firearm.153 Instead, the trial court incorrectly instructed the
jury that it was not necessary for the Commonwealth to prove the

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 626, 631–32, 822 S.E.2d at 379–82.
Id. at 631, 822 S.E.2d at 381.
295 Va. 454, 458, 813 S.E.2d 732, 733 (2018).
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2(B) (Repl. Vol. 2014).
Lewis, 295 Va. at 461, 831 S.E.2d at 735.
69 Va. App. 604, 606, 822 S.E.2d 368, 369 (2019).
Id. at 613–15, 822 S.E.2d at 373–74.
Id. at 613, 822 S.E.2d at 373.
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item was a firearm so long as the victim reasonably perceived a
threat or intimidation by a firearm.154
C. Failure to Appear
In Chavez v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
found that timely notice is not an element of felony failure to appear under the plain language of Virginia Code section 19.2128.155 The court explained that proof that a defendant failed to
appear after receiving timely notice of his or her court date is
simply one way to prove that the conduct was willful.156 The court
also found the evidence sufficient to sustain Chavez’s conviction
because a reasonable factfinder could have determined that when
his case was continued, the continuance date was clearly communicated to both Chavez and his attorney, who was present at the
next court date.157 Because there was a sufficient basis to show
that Chavez received actual notice and notice through his attorney, the Commonwealth proved that his conduct was willful and
the court upheld the conviction.158
D. Property Crimes
In McGinnis v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
reviewed whether the evidence was sufficient to convict McGinnis
of three counts of larceny by worthless check.159 The supreme
court held that “larceny by worthless check is not limited to
checks passed as present consideration for goods and services”
because the General Assembly’s 1978 amendment was intended
to expand the reach of the statute to include the use of a worthless check in payment as present consideration for goods and services, rather than to limit its application.160 The evidence was sufficient because McGinnis knew he did not have enough funds

154. Id. at 613, 822 S.E.2d at 373.
155. 69 Va. App. 149, 156–57, 817 S.E.2d 330, 334 (2018).
156. Id. at 159, 817 S.E.2d at 335 (relying on Thomas v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App.
605, 609, 633 S.E.2d 229, 231 (2006); Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 197, 200,
597 S.E.2d 210, 211 (2004); Hunter v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 717, 721–22, 427
S.E.2d 197, 200 (1993) (en banc)).
157. Id. at 165–66, 817 S.E.2d at 338.
158. Id. at 166, 817 S.E.2d at 338–39.
159. 296 Va. 489, 493–94, 821 S.E.2d 700, 702 (2018).
160. Id. at 507, 821 S.E.2d at 709.
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when he issued the checks in hopes of obtaining more credit for
his failing business.161
In Pittman v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
rejected the appellant’s arguments that the Commonwealth must
prove (1) a fiduciary relationship between the defendant and victim; and (2) the victim’s personal ownership of the allegedly embezzled property.162 The victim, an acquaintance of Pittman, allowed Pittman to borrow a rental car; Pittman ignored repeated
requests that she return the car to the rental company, and the
car was eventually towed to a body shop in New York with over
$6600 of estimated damage.163 The court of appeals found the evidence sufficient and reiterated that the Commonwealth need not
prove a formal fiduciary relationship, but could rather show that
the defendant was “entrusted with the property in question and
that the defendant had the specific intent to deprive the rightful
owner of said property.”164 Moreover, the embezzlement statute
reaches property “entrusted or delivered” to the defendant, and
the car was “delivered” to Pittman regardless of whether it was
also “entrusted.”165 Because the evidence established that
Pittman misappropriated the rental car with the requisite intent,
the court affirmed Pittman’s conviction.166
E. Forfeiture by Wrongdoing
In Cody v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether the trial court violated Cody’s Sixth Amendment confrontation right when it granted the Commonwealth’s
motion to admit out-of-court statements of the strangulation victim under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing.167 The strangulation victim asserted her Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination at trial, after Cody violated the protective order five
times by calling the victim to ask her to drop the charges.168

161. Id. at 507–08, 821 S.E.2d at 709–10.
162. 69 Va. App. 632, 635–36, 638–39, 822 S.E.2d 382, 384–85 (2019).
163. Id. at 633–34, 822 S.E.2d at 383.
164. Id. at 635–36, 638, 822 S.E.2d at 384–85 (citing Rooney v. Commonwealth, 27 Va.
App. 634, 644, 500 S.E.2d 830 (1998)).
165. Id. at 636–37, 822 S.E.2d at 384–85 (emphasis omitted).
166. Id. at 638, 822 S.E.2d at 385.
167. 68 Va. App. 638, 644, 812 S.E.2d 466, 469 (2018).
168. Id. at 647–51, 812 S.E.2d at 470–72.
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The court of appeals held that the Confrontation Clause did not
apply to the nontestimonial statements made to the 911 dispatcher and nurse, because their primary purpose was not for
prosecution.169 Although the statements made to the police were
testimonial, the court found that the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception applied.170 The court held that “the doctrine of forfeiture
by wrongdoing properly applies where a defendant unlawfully
contacts a witness with the successful intent to procure that witness’ unavailability, whether such unavailability is the witness’
physical absence from the court or through a witness’ refusal to
testify by invoking the Fifth Amendment.”171
F. Murder and Crimes of Violence
In Commonwealth v. Perkins, the Supreme Court of Virginia
reversed the Court of Appeals of Virginia’s decision, which found
insufficient evidence to support Perkins’s malicious wounding
conviction.172 Perkins hit the victim in the back of the head with a
handgun while an accomplice punched the victim simultaneously.173 The combined blows knocked the victim out and left him
with multiple head injuries.174 The supreme court held that the
evidence supported the trial court’s determination that Perkins
acted with malice, given Perkins’s unprovoked attack of the back
of the defenseless victim’s head, and the fact that the force used
was sufficient to render the victim unconscious and to inflict numerous injuries.175
In Jones v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed a conviction for shooting at an occupied vehicle where the
appellant and his victim occupied the same vehicle.176 Jones argued that the statute criminalizes “shooting into an occupied vehicle,” and that it was thus impossible to violate unless the defendant was located outside of the vehicle while shooting in its

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 657–62, 812 S.E.2d at 475–78.
Id. at 665–72, 812 S.E.2d at 479–83.
Id. at 671, 812 S.E.2d at 482.
295 Va. 323, 323, 812 S.E.2d 212, 214 (2018) (per curiam).
Id. at 325, 812 S.E.2d at 215.
Id. at 325, 812 S.E.2d at 215.
Id. at 330–33, 812 S.E.2d at 218–19.
296 Va. 412, 414, 821 S.E.2d 540, 541 (2018).
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direction.177 The court held that the plain language of the statute
contains no such requirement, and that the location of the shooter
is immaterial to the inquiry directed by the statute.178
G. Driving-Related Crimes
In Chapman v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
summarily affirmed the Court of Appeals of Virginia’s earlier decision, which found no error in Chapman’s conviction of felony
reckless driving.179 Chapman was convicted under Virginia Code
sections 46.2-852 and 46.2-868(B), the latter of which requires
proof that “as the sole and proximate result of [the defendant’s]
reckless driving, [the defendant] caused the death of another.”180
The court of appeals had held that the victim-passenger’s failure
to wear a seatbelt was not a proximate cause of his death, and
that Chapman’s reckless driving was the “sole and proximate”
cause of the victim’s death within the meaning of the statute.181
In Lambert v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether the evidence was sufficient to support Lambert’s convictions of driving while intoxicated, in violation of Virginia Code section 18.2-266, and aggravated involuntary manslaughter, in violation of section 18.2-36.1.182 Lambert was
driving a pickup truck shortly after leaving a methadone clinic
when he collided with a car driving in the other direction, resulting in the passenger’s death.183 Forensic evidence showed Lambert was under the influence of methadone, alprazolam (Xanax),
and nordiazepam.184 Lambert claimed on appeal that the Commonwealth failed to prove that (1) the drugs in his blood were
“self-administered,” relying on Jackson v. Commonwealth;185 and
(2) he had not consumed the drugs after the time of the accident.186 The court found that Lambert’s admission that he had
177.
178.
179.
180.
(2017).
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 415, 821 S.E.2d at 542.
Id. at 415–17, 821 S.E.2d at 542–43.
296 Va. 386, 386, 820 S.E.2d 611, 611 (2018).
Chapman v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 131, 133–34, 804 S.E.2d 326, 327–38
Id. at 145, 804 S.E.2d at 333.
70 Va. App. 54, 57, 824 S.E.2d 18, 20 (2019).
Id. at 57–59, 824 S.E.2d at 20–21.
Id. at 59, 824 S.E.2d at 21.
274 Va. 630, 652 S.E.2d 111 (2007).
Lambert, 70 Va. App. at 63, 65, 824 S.E.2d at 24.
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visited a methadone clinic shortly before the accident, after he initially denied taking any drugs before driving, entitled the factfinder to conclude that Lambert “had taken the drugs and initially lied about not consuming them to conceal his guilt.”187 The
court further found that circumstantial evidence excluded the
possibility that Lambert ingested the drugs found in his blood after the time of the accident, since Lambert was not left unattended from shortly after the accident until his blood was drawn, and
since his symptoms throughout that time corresponded with the
depressant effects of the drugs in his system.188
H. Probation Violations
In Green v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
reviewed whether the circuit court had jurisdiction to revoke the
appellant’s suspended sentence.189 In 1993, Green pled guilty to
felony arson and was sentenced to ten years of incarceration with
nine years suspended in addition to a period of active supervised
probation.190 Green later moved to dismiss a show cause issued
for conduct in 2015 on the grounds that his period of suspension
had already expired, even though he was in custody for the majority of the time in question due to serving an active sentence for
an unrelated crime until his release in 2014.191
The court of appeals reversed Green’s violation, finding that
the period of suspension was not tolled by his incarceration.192
The court additionally noted that even though the order provided
that supervised probation would not commence until Green’s release from custody, there was no authority to revoke his suspended sentence because the period of probation cannot exceed the period of suspension.193

187. Id. at 64, 824 S.E.2d at 24.
188. Id. at 65–67, 824 S.E.2d at 24. The court also rejected Lambert’s argument that
the trial court erred by excluding impeachment evidence regarding a police witness’s unspecified criminal charge and suspension from the Virginia State Police (he was subsequently convicted of soliciting a prostitute and dismissed from the force), on the grounds
that the proffered evidence was expressly prohibited by Virginia Supreme Court Rule
2:608(b). Id. at 60–62, 824 S.E.2d at 21–22.
189. 69 Va. App. 99, 101, 815 S.E.2d 821, 822 (2018).
190. Id. at 102, 815 S.E.2d at 822.
191. Id. at 101–02, 815 S.E.2d at 822.
192. Id. at 104–05, 815 S.E.2d at 823.
193. Id. at 104–05, 815 S.E.2d at 823.
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In Johnson v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
was asked to apply the tests outlined in Henderson v. Commonwealth194 for the admissibility of hearsay in revocation proceedings.195 The trial court admitted hearsay testimony from two
young women who reported that Johnson, who was a sex offender, made inappropriate contact with them.196 The defendant challenged the veracity of the girls’ allegations, asserting that his
Confrontation Clause and Due Process rights were violated.197
The supreme court noted that defendants are generally entitled
to cross-examine adverse witnesses at revocation proceedings unless there is good cause for not allowing confrontation.198 Courts
are to consider two overlapping tests in order to find the requisite
good cause: a reliability test and a balancing test.199 The supreme
court held that the challenged statements were admissible in
Johnson because there was sufficient corroboration—there were
text messages to and from the defendant, Johnson worked where
the girls indicated he did, and he matched their descriptions.200
I. Perjury
In Gerald v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendants’ perjury convictions and that Albemarle County Circuit
Court was a proper venue.201 At trial before the general district
court, the Commonwealth proved that one co-defendant drove the
vehicle when it got into an accident, and the other drove from the
scene of the crime.202 The Commonwealth also proved that shortly
after the accident, they told a police officer that one had been
driving on a suspended license.203 However, under oath in their
defense, both defendants testified that neither drove the car nor

194. 285 Va. 318, 327–28, 736 S.E.2d 901, 906 (2013).
195. 296 Va. 266, 270, 274, 819 S.E.2d 425, 427, 429 (2018).
196. Id. at 269–70, 819 S.E.2d at 426–27.
197. Id. at 270, 819 S.E.2d at 427.
198. Id. at 275, 819 S.E.2d at 430 (citing Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 612 (1985)).
199. Id. at 275–76, 819 S.E.2d at 430 (citing Henderson, 285 Va. at 327–28, 736 S.E.2d
at 906).
200. Id. at 279, 819 S.E.2d at 432.
201. 295 Va. 469, 486, 813 S.E.2d 722, 731–32 (2018).
202. Id. at 480, 813 S.E.2d at 727.
203. Id. at 480, 813 S.E.2d at 727–28.
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told the police officer that they had been driving or had suspended licenses.204
The court affirmed their convictions because
[i]n light of the detailed nature of the evidence of [the defendants’]
driving with reference to the accident, it would be unreasonable to
conclude that the Geralds’ denials of driving were in response to ambiguous questioning or an inquiry into their driving at a time or
place other than what the Commonwealth actually sought to
prove.205

The court also held that venue was proper because the City of
Charlottesville and Albemarle County have joint jurisdiction over
county property located within the City of Charlottesville, which
is where the crime of perjury was committed.206
J. Sex Offenders
In Turner v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia issued an order clarifying who must register as a sexually violent
offender based on an out-of-state conviction.207 Virginia Code section 9.1-902(F)(ii) classifies an individual as sexually violent for
“any offense for which registration in a sex offender and crimes
against minors registry is required under the laws of the jurisdiction where the offender was convicted.”208 Despite Turner’s argument that the legislature did not intend to classify all out-of-state
offenders as “violent,” the court found the statutory language
clear and unambiguous.209 The court affirmed his conviction and
made clear that all persons convicted of such offenses out-of-state
are properly classified as sexually violent within the meaning of
the statute.210

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 480, 813 S.E.2d at 727–28.
Id. at 481–82, 813 S.E.2d at 728.
Id. at 483–85, 813 S.E.2d at 729–31.
826 S.E.2d 307, 308 (2019).
VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-902(F)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 2019).
Turner, 826 S.E.2d at 309.
Id. at 310.
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K. Sex Crimes
In Commonwealth v. Murgia, the Supreme Court of Virginia
explained Virginia Code section 18.2-374.3(D) requires the intent
to use a communications device “for ‘the purpose of soliciting,
with lascivious intent, any child [the defendant] knows or has
reason to believe is at least’” fifteen, but less than eighteen, years
old “‘to knowingly and intentionally’ commit one of the proscribed
acts.”211 The victim and her track coach, Murgia, communicated
via text message on three different occasions.212 During two of the
texting conversations, the victim requested assistance from Murgia to improve her high jump, and Murgia responded with sexual
references.213 In the last conversation, Murgia texted her about a
graphic dream he had involving her in great detail.214 The supreme court found the evidence sufficient to show Murgia used a
communications device for the purpose of soliciting the victim
under those facts.215
In Hillman v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
affirmed Hillman’s conviction for taking indecent liberties with a
child.216 Hillman, a twenty-two-year-old youth pastor, asked A.F.,
a fourteen-year-old youth group member, to send him a photo of
her nude upper body via Snapchat, an “image messaging mobile
phone application,” which automatically deletes messages shortly
after they are viewed by the recipient.217 A.F. sent Hillman the
requested photo, and in return, Hillman sent A.F. photos of his
erect penis via Snapchat.218 The trial court admitted photographs
taken from Hillman’s iPad of male genitalia after A.F. authenticated them as being “similar” to the photos she had received from
Hillman via Snapchat.219 Hillman challenged his indecent liberties conviction, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion
211. 827 S.E.2d 377, 383 (2019) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-374.3(D) (Repl. Vol.
2014)).
212. Id. at 380.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 380–81.
215. Id. at 384.
216. 68 Va. App. 585, 589, 811 S.E.2d 853, 855 (2018).
217. Id. at 589–91 & 589 n.1, 811 S.E.2d at 855–56 & 855 n.1 (quoting State v. Bariteau, 884 N.W.2d 169, 172 n.1 (S.D. 2016)).
218. Id. at 590, 811 S.E.2d at 856. Hillman and A.F. exchanged additional photos and
videos showing both persons nude. Id. at 590, 811 S.E.2d at 856.
219. Id. at 590–91, 811 S.E.2d at 856.
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by admitting the photographs, and that the evidence did not support a finding that he had exposed himself to A.F. (1) in her physical presence; and (2) contemporaneous (or “live and in real time”)
with such physical presence.220 The court rejected these arguments, finding that the law did not require either physical presence or a contemporaneous exposure, and held that any error in
admitting the photos was harmless given A.F.’s testimony, Hillman’s confession, and the properly admitted text messages corroborating the Snapchat conversation.221
In Carr v. Commonwealth, Carr challenged the sufficiency of
the evidence for his convictions of sex trafficking, conspiracy to
commit trafficking, abduction, conspiracy to commit abduction,
and the use of a firearm in the commission of an abduction.222 The
Court of Appeals of Virginia held that Carr was a principal in the
second degree to abduction because the crime was complete when
Carr and his co-conspirators forced the human trafficking victim
to return under duress to the hotel.223 Carr participated in abduction by confronting the victim and encouraging another coconspirator to threaten her.224 The court held that the evidence
was sufficient to convict Carr of sex trafficking because he benefited from prostitution by knowingly staying in a room paid for by
the proceeds of prostitution.225
Carr’s convictions for conspiracy to commit abduction and sex
trafficking were affirmed because the evidence established that
three men, including Carr, went to the hotel room armed with a
handgun, confronted and castigated the victim, and forced her to
return to the house.226 The evidence also supported Carr’s conspiracy to commit sex trafficking conviction when he stayed with
the group in the hotel room rented with the prostitution earnings,
the men told her that “she couldn’t live for free,” the coconspirators set up the prostitution advertisement, and Carr confronted the victim when she left prostitution and told a coconspirator to threaten to pistol-whip her.227 Finally, in affirming
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 594, 600, 811 S.E.2d at 857, 861.
Id. at 594–99, 601–02, 811 S.E.2d at 858–61.
69 Va. App. 106, 110, 816 S.E.2d 591, 593–94 (2018).
Id. at 115, 816 S.E.2d at 596.
Id. at 114–15, 816 S.E.2d at 596.
Id. at 117, 816 S.E.2d at 597.
Id. at 117–19, 816 S.E.2d at 597–98.
Id. at 119–20, 816 S.E.2d at 598.
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the use of a firearm in the commission of an abduction conviction,
the court of appeals noted that “it is not necessary for a defendant
to physically possess a firearm to be convicted . . . if the defendant
was acting in concert with the gunman to commit the underlying
felony.”228
In Cabral v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether a Taser constituted a dangerous weapon under Virginia Code section 18.2-67.3.229 Cabral used a Taser three
times to attack and sexually assault a female jogger causing her
injuries.230 Relying on the plain language of the statute, the court
of appeals held that the Taser was a dangerous weapon under the
statute and rejected Cabral’s argument that the Commonwealth
had to prove the Taser was a deadly weapon.231
L. Felony Child Neglect and Endangerment
In Camp v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that a mother’s decision to drive with her children in her vehicle while she had a blood alcohol content in excess of .25 was
sufficient to support a finding that she had “committed a ‘willful
act or omission in the care of [her children that] was so gross,
wanton, and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human
life,’” supporting her convictions for felony child neglect under
Virginia Code section 18.2-371.1(B).232
M. Attempts
In Jones v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
reversed an attempted robbery conviction for insufficient evi-

228. Id. at 120–21, 816 S.E.2d at 599.
229. 69 Va. App. 67, 69–70, 815 S.E.2d 805, 806 (2018).
230. Id. at 69–70, 815 S.E.2d at 806.
231. Id. at 72–74, 815 S.E.2d at 808–09.
232. 68 Va. App. 694, 701–02, 705–06, 813 S.E.2d 10, 14, 16 (2018) (quoting VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-371.1(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2016)). The court distinguished Camp’s conduct from
the result in Coomer v. Commonwealth, finding that while Coomer’s blood alcohol content
level (between .09 and .11) did not support conviction standing alone, “[Camp’s] level of
intoxication was more than three times the legal limit . . . and approximately two and a
half times the level in Coomer” and therefore “sufficient to support [Camp]’s convictions.”
Id. at 704–06, 813 S.E.2d at 15–16 (referencing Coomer v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App.
537, 797 S.E.2d 787 (2017)).
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dence.233 Police observed an individual leave a car parked in a
housing complex, and then observed two other men exit the car a
few minutes later.234 The individuals fled when the police identified themselves, but were ultimately apprehended.235 Police recovered a ski mask in the car and another in a street Jones had
traveled before being stopped.236 Police also found a sawed-off
shotgun where they saw Jones running.237 Jones admitted going
to the housing complex to make sure that the co-defendant “didn’t
get hurt” while he “rob[bed] a known drug dealer.”238
The court found that the Commonwealth failed to prove an act
in furtherance of criminal intent.239 The Commonwealth must
prove “a direct, but ineffectual, act to accomplish the crime.”240
Such an act must reach “far enough toward the accomplishment
of the desired result to amount to the commencement of the consummation,” or, in other words, an “action that begins (commences) the execution (consummation) of one or more elements of a
crime but does not complete all of them.”241 The court rejected the
Commonwealth’s argument that any slight act done in furtherance of a defendant’s criminal intent would be sufficient.242 The
majority found that the overt act, however slight, must still implicate one or more elements of the offense in order to sustain an
attempt conviction.243
N. Evidence
In Melick v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
delineated who may authenticate business records as a hearsay
233. 70 Va. App. 307, 334, 826 S.E.2d 908, 922 (2019) (en banc).
234. Id. at 312, 826 S.E.2d at 911.
235. Id. at 312, 826 S.E.2d at 911.
236. Id. at 312–13, 826 S.E.2d at 911.
237. Id. at 313, 826 S.E.2d at 911.
238. Id. at 313, 826 S.E.2d at 911.
239. Id. at 331, 826 S.E.2d at 920.
240. Id. at 318, 826 S.E.2d at 914 (quoting Pitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 692, 695,
539 S.E.2d 77, 79 (2000)).
241. Id. at 319, 826 S.E.2d at 914 (quoting Jay v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 510, 526,
659 S.E.2d 311, 320 (2008)).
242. Id. at 325, 826 S.E.2d at 917.
243. Id. at 326, 826 S.E.2d at 917–18. While the concurrence would also have found the
evidence insufficient, it disagreed with the overt act definition provided by the majority,
asserting it runs counter to Supreme Court of Virginia precedent. Id. at 335–36, 826
S.E.2d at 922–23.
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exception.244 Melick argued that records stored on an online database were improperly admitted.245 The court found that information stored by an entity other than the one which created it
does not alter the “nature of the records.”246 The character of the
information does not change simply because the business records
in question were uploaded onto a database, so the creator of the
record could still authenticate it.247 Although the record did not
show precisely who uploaded the information or when, the court
concluded that there was sufficient evidence that the information
came from the clerk who conducted the transaction and there
were guarantees of trustworthiness surrounding the information
to satisfy the contemporaneousness requirement of the hearsay
exception.248 The court also explained that a custodian of records
was not needed for authentication so long as the supporting witness was “qualified.”249
O. Miscellaneous
In Brown v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
reviewed a defendant’s convictions for use of a firearm, attempted
murder, capital murder, and attempted capital murder.250 Although Brown argued that the trial court erred in denying him access to preceding years’ grand jury lists, the court of appeals determined any error was harmless because a finding of guilt
renders harmless any defect in the composition of a grand jury,
absent structural constitutional errors.251 The court explained
that no authoritative tribunal has yet held that a defendant may
make a Sixth Amendment fair-cross-section challenge against a
state’s grand jury procedures, and he otherwise had no right to
the information.252 Moreover, Brown made no attempt to limit or
tailor his request to his indictment year, given the valid privacy

244. 69 Va. App. 122, 135, 816 S.E.2d 599, 605 (2018). The Court also rejected Melick’s
sufficiency argument, finding that the victim’s testimony that the stolen items were valued at more than $200 was sufficient. Id. at 147, 816 S.E.2d at 611.
245. Id. at 133, 816 S.E.2d at 605.
246. Id. at 135, 816 S.E.2d at 606.
247. Id. at 135–36, 816 S.E.2d at 606.
248. Id. at 137–39, 816 S.E.2d at 607.
249. Id. at 141–42, 816 S.E.2d at 609.
250. 68 Va. App. 746, 757, 813 S.E.2d 557, 562 (2018).
251. Id. at 770, 813 S.E.2d at 568.
252. Id. at 774–75, 813 S.E.2d at 570–71.
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concerns at play.253 As a result, given that Brown had no right to
receive the information and the relevant issues at trial, the court
reasoned that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown’s motion.254
The court of appeals also affirmed the trial court’s denial of
Brown’s motion to change venue, finding that the defendant did
not overcome the presumption that he would receive a fair trial in
the county he was tried in.255 The trial court also did not err in
denying Brown’s motion to strike prospective jurors for cause because any tentative opinions formed by the jurors were that the
appellant shot the victim—which was not a fact in controversy.256
The court additionally rejected Brown’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to determine that the appellant murdered
his victim, a law enforcement officer, with the purpose of interfering with the performance of his official duties.257 The court further found that there was no error in the denial of Brown’s proffered instruction on second-degree murder because “no evidence
. . . support[ed] a finding that appellant acted without willfulness,
deliberation, or premeditation.”258 The court also made clear that
criminal discovery requires disclosure of volunteered statements
or confessions made to law enforcement only in response to police
questions, and not those to a police officer made in open court
that the officer only happens to hear.259
P. Affirmative Defenses
In Davis v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
decided whether a juvenile and domestic relations judge’s statement could give rise to an affirmative defense of reasonable reliance.260 Davis was the subject of a protective order, which he and
his wife believed had been dismissed based on an order dismiss-

253. Id. at 775, 813 S.E.2d at 571.
254. Id. at 776, 813 S.E.2d at 571.
255. Id. at 776, 813 S.E.2d at 571.
256. Id. at 783–86, 813 S.E.2d at 575–76.
257. Id. at 786, 813 S.E.2d at 576.
258. Id. at 789, 791, 813 S.E.2d at 578.
259. Id. at 792–93, 813 S.E.2d at 579–80. The court also found there was no error in
the trial court’s denial of Brown’s motion to set aside because the jury was entitled to disbelieve the defense’s expert testimony that he was legally insane at the time of the offense.
Id. at 794–95, 813 S.E.2d at 580.
260. 68 Va. App. 725, 728, 813 S.E.2d 547, 548 (2018).
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ing “all petitions.”261 Later, Davis was stopped while transporting
a firearm and was charged with possessing a firearm while subject to a protective order in violation of Virginia Code section
18.2-308.1:4(B).262 The court reversed the trial court’s decision not
to provide a reasonable reliance jury instruction, finding that
judges qualify as government officials and have a “duty to interpret and apply the law and therefore their statements can implicate the reasonable reliance defense.”263
III. LEGISLATION
A. Venue
The 2019 General Assembly expanded venue for the prosecution of certain credit card offenses in Virginia Code section 18.2198.1 to include the jurisdiction where the cardholder victim resides.264 The General Assembly also expanded venue for forgery
prosecutions to include “any county or city . . . where an issuer,
acquirer, or account holder sustained a financial loss.”265
The General Assembly additionally modified the transferability
of juvenile delinquency cases to the juvenile’s home jurisdiction to
allow courts to transfer cases after a finding of “facts sufficient”
for a finding of delinquency.266
B. Sex Offenses
The General Assembly passed legislation creating a Class 1
misdemeanor for a travel agent to knowingly promote travel services for the purposes of prostitution or certain sexually violent
offenses.267

261.
262.
263.
264.

Id. at 728–29, 813 S.E.2d at 548–49 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 728–29, 813 S.E.2d at 548–49.
Id. at 733–34, 813 S.E.2d at 551.
Act of Feb. 27, 2019, ch. 177, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-198.1 (Cum. Supp. 2019)). Previously, venue only lay where any act in
furtherance of the crime occurred or where an issuer, acquirer, or an agent sustained a
financial loss. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-198.1 (Repl. Vol. 2017).
265. Act of Feb. 19, 2019, ch. 46, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-245.1 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
266. Act of Mar. 5, 2019, ch. 235, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-243 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
267. Act of Mar. 18, 2019, ch. 458, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
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C. Expungement
The 2019 General Assembly passed new legislation providing
for automatic expungement when someone is absolutely pardoned
for a crime that he or she has been found to be actually innocent
of.268 The Secretary of the Commonwealth is required to forward
a copy of any such absolute pardon to the circuit court where the
person was originally convicted.269
D. Bail
The General Assembly passed a bill to address bail determinations on appeal.270 If a higher court decides bail, the bail determination is to be remanded to the court in which the case is pending
for any subsequent enforcement and modification.271 The lower
court, upon remand, may not modify the bail decision of the higher court absent a change in circumstances.272 Further, if the matter is pending in a court not of record, bond modifications should
first be heard in that court unless: (i) the bail decision is on appeal; (ii) the charge has been transferred to a circuit court; or (iii)
such charge has been certified by a district court.273
E. Grand Juries
The 2019 General Assembly made clear that any person granted permission to make notes or copy evidence in a multijurisdiction grand jury “shall maintain the secrecy of all information obtained” from it, except for necessary disclosures for use
in a criminal investigation or proceeding.274 Prosecutors must no-

CODE ANN. § 18.2-348.1 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
268. Act of Feb. 27, 2019, ch. 181, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-402, 19.2-392.2 (Cum. Supp. 2019)). Previously, an individual had to petition for expungement. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-402 (Repl. Vol. 2017); id. § 19.2-392.2 (Cum.
Supp. 2016).
269. Ch. 181, 2019 Va. Acts at __.
270. Act of Mar. 19, 2019, ch. 616, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-124, -130, -132 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
271. Id. ch. 616, 2019 Va. Acts at __.
272. Id. ch. 616, 2019 Va. Acts at __.
273. Id. ch. 616, 2019 Va. Acts at __.
274. Act of Mar. 18, 2019, ch. 522, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-215.9 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
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tify a defendant indicted by the multi-jurisdiction grand jury that
it was used to obtain evidence.275
F. Protective Orders
The 2019 General Assembly created an “acts of god” exception
to the requirement that preliminary protective orders be heard
within fifteen days of the issuance of the preliminary order,
providing that the order shall remain in effect until another protective order is entered.276 The General Assembly also created a
requirement for courts to state the basis for the issuance of preliminary protective orders arising out of ex parte hearings in certain circumstances.277
G. Homicide
The General Assembly created new legislation requiring that
anyone who was an adult on their offense date who commits capital murder of a law enforcement officer or certain other public
safety officials shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term
of imprisonment for life.278
H. Traffic Offenses and Driving Under the Influence
The 2019 General Assembly created another class of felony, a
Class 6 felony, for when a defendant is guilty of maiming while
driving under the influence, and it results in “serious bodily inju-

275. Id. ch. 522, 2019 Va. Acts at __.
276. Act of Mar. 5, 2019, ch. 197, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 16.1-253.1, 19.2-152.9 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
277. Act of Mar. 21, 2019, ch. 718, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-112, -253.1, -296, 19.2-152.9 (Cum. Supp. 2019)). If the petition is filed
without an affidavit or a form completed by a law enforcement officer which includes the
basis for the order, and is instead based upon sworn testimony, the order must state the
basis on which it was entered, including a summary of the allegations made and the
court’s findings. Id. ch. 718, 2019 Va. Acts at __. The bill further provides that an appeal of
a permanent protective order must be docketed within two business days of receipt of such
an appeal. Id. ch. 718, 2019 Va. Acts at __.
278. Act of Mar. 21, 2019, ch. 717, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Cum. Supp. 2019)). This legislation modified the law following the
Supreme Court of Virginia’s holding in Jones v. Commonwealth, which found that courts
had the discretion to suspend any or all of the life sentence referenced in Virginia Code
section 18.2-31. See 293 Va. 29, 795 S.E.2d 705 (2017).

<$7(6'2&; '2127'(/(7( 

2019]

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

$0

67

ry.”279 The act provides that if the driver acts in a manner which
is “so gross, wanton, and culpable as to show a reckless disregard
for human life,” the individual is guilty even if he or she does not
intentionally cause the injury.280 Serious bodily injury is defined
as “bodily injury that involves substantial risk of death, extreme
physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ,
or mental faculty.”281
New legislation makes it unlawful to use a personal communications device when a driver holds such a device in his hand
while driving in a highway work zone.282 A new law also makes a
driver’s failure to yield the closest lane to, or slow down for, a stationary vehicle on a shoulder either a traffic infraction or a criminal reckless driving offense.283
I. Drug Offenses
The 2019 General Assembly repealed the requirement that an
individual “substantially cooperate” in a criminal investigation in
order to be eligible for the affirmative defense for possession
crimes under Virginia Code section 18.2-251.03.284
The General Assembly also amended several laws governing
the minimum age to purchase, possess, or sell tobacco products,
nicotine vapor products, and alternative nicotine products, raising the minimum age from eighteen to twenty-one.285 The

279. Act of Mar. 18, 2019, ch. 465, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-51.4 to -51.5 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
280. Id. ch. 465, 2019 Va. Acts at __.
281. Id. ch. 465, 2019 Va. Acts at __.
282. Act of Apr. 29, 2019, ch. 849, 2019 Va. Acts. __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.2-1078.1 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
283. Act of Apr. 29, 2019, ch. 850, 2019 Va. Acts. __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
46.2-861.1 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
284. Act of Mar. 19, 2019, ch. 626, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-251.03 (Cum. Supp. 2019)). The statute provides an affirmative defense
for individuals whose possession crimes were only discovered as a result of the individual
seeking or obtaining emergency medical attention under certain conditions. Id. § 18.2251.03 (Cum. Supp. 2019).
285. Act of Feb. 21, 2019, ch. 90, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.2-246.8, -246.10, -371.2 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
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amendments exempt active duty military personnel who are
eighteen or older from the increased minimum age.286
J. Drones
The 2019 General Assembly added a new subpart to the statute criminalizing drone trespass, making it a Class 1 misdemeanor to take off or land in violation of federal regulations.287
The General Assembly also amended the law governing when
police officers must obtain a warrant to use a drone, allowing police to use drones without a warrant to (a) aerially survey the
primary residence of the subject of an arrest warrant to formulate
a plan to execute an existing arrest warrant or capias; or (b) locate a person sought for arrest when law enforcement remains in
hot pursuit of the person following their flight.288
K. Animal Cruelty and Related Legislation
The 2019 General Assembly passed several laws protecting animals. It expanded the Class 6 felony for animal abuse to include
abuse of a companion animal when the animal is seriously injured but does not die.289 Additionally, animal control officers are
now allowed to confiscate any tethered cock or any other animal
that they determine has been used in animal fighting.290
L. Miscellaneous Crimes
The 2019 General Assembly created a misdemeanor for any
person who, with the intent to defraud, intimidate, or harass,
causes a telephone to ring and engages in conduct resulting in the
display of false caller identification information.291

286. Id. ch. 90, 2019 Va. Acts at __.
287. Act of Mar. 19, 2019, ch. 612, 2019 Va. Acts __,
CODE ANN. § 18.2-121.3 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
288. Act of Mar. 22, 2019, ch. 781, 2019 Va. Acts __,
CODE ANN. § 19.2-60.1 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
289. Act. of Mar. 18, 2019, ch. 537, 2019 Va. Acts __,
CODE ANN. § 3.2-6570 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
290. Act. of Mar. 12, 2019, ch. 345, 2019 Va. Acts __,
CODE ANN. § 3.2-6571 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
291. Act of Mar. 18, 2019, ch. 476, 2019 Va. Acts __,

__ (codified as amended at VA.
__ (codified as amended at VA.
__ (codified as amended at VA.
__ (codified as amended at VA.
__ (codified as amended at VA.
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The General Assembly added health care workers to the class
of victims outlined in Virginia Code section 18.2-60.292 That section provides that where a person makes an oral threat to kill or
cause bodily injury to both school employees and health care
workers engaged in the course of their official duties, he or she is
guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.293
The General Assembly also modified the definition of gambling
outlined in section 18.2-325.294 Illegal gambling now includes betting or wagering of any “consideration” made in exchange for a
“chance to win a prize, stake, or other consideration or thing of
value” by operating a gambling device “regardless of whether the
chance to win such prize, stake, or other consideration or thing of
value may be offered in the absence of a purchase.”295
Under new legislation, it is a Class 1 misdemeanor to simulate
a crime in public, with the intent to mislead police, causing someone who is unaware the crime is fake to call in a report to police.296
A new law specifies that failure to appear to court for a criminal offense is punishable under section 18.2-456 and is not punishable under section 16.1-69.24.297
M. Sex Offenders and Registration
The 2019 General Assembly passed a statute prohibiting any
person required to register on the Sex Offender and Crimes
Against Minors Registry (or its federal equivalent) from operating
a taxicab for the transportation of passengers for hire.298


CODE ANN. § 18.2-429.1 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
292. Act of Mar. 18, 2019, ch. 506, 2019 Va. Acts __,
CODE ANN. § 18.2-6-60 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
293. VA. CODE. ANN. § 18.2-6-60 (Cum. Supp. 2019).
294. Act of Mar. 21, 2019, ch. 761, 2019 Va. Acts __,
CODE ANN. § 18.2-325) (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
295. Id. ch. 761, 2019 Va. Acts at __.
296. Act. of Mar. 18, 2019, ch. 471, 2019 Va. Acts __,
CODE ANN. § 18.2-461 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
297. Act. of Mar. 31, 2019, ch. 708, 2019 Va. Acts __,
CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-69.24, 18.2-456 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
298. Act of Mar. 18, 2019, ch. 480, 2019 Va. Acts __,
CODE ANN. § 46.2-2011.33 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).

__ (codified as amended at VA.
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The General Assembly also changed the timeframe for the reregistration of sex offenders, requiring offenders to re-register according to categories assigned by their birth month and last
name.299
N. Sex Crimes
Virginia Code section 18.2-386.2, criminalizing the dissemination of certain nude videos or pictures of another with the intent
to coerce, harass, or intimidate, now includes people who modify
photos and videos with the intent to depict the subject of
the image.300
O. Child Victims and Abuse
The legislature passed a law adding ministers, priests, rabbis,
imam, and other clergy members to the list of people required to
report suspected child abuse or neglect, unless the clergy member
is required by the doctrine of the religious organization to keep
that information confidential, or the information would be subject
to certain evidentiary exemptions.301
The General Assembly also confirmed child victims of commercial sex trafficking or prostitution will be allowed to testify by a
two-way, closed-circuit television.302
P. Elder Abuse
The 2019 General Assembly clarified that the informed consent
exemption to elder abuse requires that the incapacitated adult
must have given the consent when the adult had capacity.303

299. Act of Mar. 19, 2019, ch. 613, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
9.1-904 (Cum. Supp. 2019)). Previously, offenders registered a specified number of days
following their initial registration. VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-904 (2018). This is scheduled to go
into effect on July 1, 2020. Ch. 613, 2019 Va. Acts at __.
300. Act of Mar. 18, 2019, ch. 490, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.2 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
301. Act. of Mar. 18, 2019, ch. 414, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 63.2-1509 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
302. Act. of Feb. 22, 2019, ch. 146, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
303. Act. of Mar. 5, 2019, ch. 234, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-369 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
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Q. Testing
Finally, the 2019 General Assembly created a tracking system
for Physical Evidence Recovery Kits (“PERK”).304 Health care
providers are required to inform sexual assault victims of their
unique identification numbers and to provide them with information regarding the system, which is otherwise confidential and
not subject to disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.305

304. Act of Mar. 18, 2019, ch. 473, 2019 Va. Acts __, __ (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 19.2-11.13 (Cum. Supp. 2019)).
305. Id. ch. 473, 2019 Va. Acts at __.

